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From the creation of the Intelligence Community as part of the National Security 
Act of 1947 to present day, congressional oversight has varied depending on popular 
interest generated by media reports of scandal or due to perceived failures.  Conversely 
the Intelligence Community has used the varying degrees of oversight as an opportunity 
to participate in activities outside its charter.  This thesis examines the evolution of 
congressional oversight from virtually non-existent to the current efforts to reform the 
Intelligence Community.  What this study demonstrates is that oversight has primarily 
been driven in response to an abuse or a failure.  It has been popular interest fueled by 
media involvement that has forced congressional action.  This is demonstrated by 
examining the wave of reform after the publication of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
abuse of power in 1970, again after the revelation of the Iran-contra affair in 1986 and 
lastly after the September 11th attacks.  The study also uncovers a reoccurrence in the 
recommended reforms, particularly the recommendation for the creation of a Director of 
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I.   INTRODUCTION:  THE EVOLUTION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT FROM IGNORANCE TO INVOLVEMENT (1947-2005) 
Americans have always had an ambivalent attitude toward intelligence. When 
they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they don’t, they regard the whole 




The purpose of this study is to examine the changes in intelligence oversight since 
1947, by focusing on several critical periods that drove the United States Congress to 
investigate intelligence professionals and the intelligence system.  My methodology is to 
use previous proposed and implemented changes in congressional intelligence oversight 
as a tool to evaluate the changes recommended in the 9/11 Commission’s Report.  The 
thesis will examine four separate periods of intelligence oversight as case studies of 
reform implementation and will use the resulting lessons-learned to evaluate the future of 
congressional oversight. 
Intelligence oversight is a critical component in ensuring that the Intelligence 
Community does not overstep its bounds and “acts” more efficiently and cooperatively.  
As has been demonstrated in other nations, the Intelligence Community, if not properly 
regulated, has the potential to use its authority and intelligence-gathering tools for 
political gain.  This can transform a benign Intelligence Community from a security tool 
to a threat to the democracy it is supposed to serve.  An examination of the 9/11 
Commission’s Report and the Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act 
provides a basis for evaluating how the proposed and implemented changes may weaken 
or strengthen the U.S. Intelligence Community. 
This study will center on the changing emphasis on intelligence oversight.  
Congressional oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community has been marked by several 
distinct periods and levels of involvement.  The first period began in 1947 with the 
creation of the current Intelligence Community by the National Security Act and lasted 
until the media brought to light a series of abuses in the early 1970s.  The second period 
commenced with the congressional investigations and reforms of 1974-1975 and ended 
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with the legislation changes adopted in 1980.  The third period, 1980 to 2001, was 
marked by swings in congressional response from ambivalence to outrage at continued 
abuses.  The final and current period addressed resulted from the September 11th tragedy 
and, as addressed here, includes the 9/11 Commission’s investigation and 
recommendations.  In sum, this document will identify common oversight themes and 
common problems in congressional oversight implementation and will make 
recommendations. 
This thesis will outline the significant developments in each period and the 
evolution of congressional intelligence oversight in the United States by outlining four 
broad “ages.”  In addition, this document will explain what drove congressional oversight 
in each period and how that oversight shaped the level of intelligence involvement in 
domestic matters during each period.  The first age I call the Age of Trust and Ignorance, 
which was typified by an absence of interest in the actions of the Intelligence 
Community.  The second period was the Age of Investigation and Reform, in which the 
Congress was spurred to an oversight role due to a public outcry over allegations of 
widespread abuse.  The third age was marked by an ebbing and flowing of oversight.  
During this period interest, in oversight could be sparked by scandal.  This was the Age 
of Consolidation.  The last age is the Age of Reevaluation.  Induced by the public and 
political outcry after the 9/11 attacks, significant changes to intelligence oversight have 
been proposed. 
A.   THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT 
The Intelligence Community as we know it was founded by the National Security 
Act of 1947.  This legislation converted the World War II Office of Strategic Services to 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and aligned existing military intelligence 
organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD).  The National Security Act 
outlined the roles and responsibilities of the Intelligence Community, and specifically 
identified that the CIA and the DoD area of concern was foreign intelligence.  It was their 





B.   THE AGE OF TRUST AND IGNORANCE (1947-1974) 
The initial period of intelligence oversight, from the adoption of the National 
Security Act of 1947 until the chartering of the executive and legislative investigative 
committees, is commonly known as the “Era of Trust.”  The pervasive Cold War threat 
and a general lack of interest on the part of governmental players led to the assumption 
that the nations’ Intelligence Community knew best how to protect its citizens and that 
nonintelligence professionals would only interfere with the performance of those duties.  
C.   THE AGE OF INVESTIGATION AND REFORM (1974-1980) 
    While there had previously been on-again, off-again attempts to exert 
legislative oversight, the effort took on new urgency in the winter of 1974.  In December 
1974, the New York Times made public multiple abuses by the CIA.  A Times article 
uncovered the CIA’s “family jewels,” which consisted of 693 pages of legal violations 
and questionable activities by the agency.  The current DCIA, William Colby, upon 
taking office, had directed the compiling of the “jewels” as part of an internal 
investigation of possible questionable activities, some of which were leaked to the New 
York Times.  These revelations were highly damning for the Intelligence Community’s 
reputation and drove the Senate and the House to take action.  The public outcry from 
these incidences led to the creation of three separate investigative committees, commonly 
referred to by the name of their individual chairmen: the Rockefeller commission for the 
executive branch, the Church Commission in the Senate, and the Pike Commission for 
the House.  As a result of the committees’ findings, Congress enacted significant reforms 
that impacted not just the CIA, but all intelligence agencies.   The first of these changes 
was the creation of the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974.  It directed that no funds were to be 
expended by the CIA for nonintelligence operations (covert actions) unless the president 
determined the operation was required for national security and the appropriate 
committees (eighteen, at the time) in the Congress were informed in a timely manner.   
This age of investigation and reform ended with the Intelligence Oversight Act of 
1980, which requires that the heads of intelligence agencies keep the oversight 
committees “fully and currently informed” of their activities, including “any significant 
anticipated intelligence activity.”  Detailed ground rules were established for reporting 
covert actions to the Congress, but only in return for the number of congressional 
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committees receiving notice of covert actions being limited to the two oversight 
committees.  The act also explicitly outlines that military intelligence has no domestic 
responsibilities.  
D.   THE AGE OF OVERSIGHT CONSOLIDATION (1981-2001) 
After an initial surge in intelligence oversight, both the Senate and the House 
settled in for the long haul, as oversight became institutionalized in the Congress and the 
executive branch came to accept congressional involvement.  Thus the abuses that had 
come to light in the 1970s changed the nature of the relationship between Congress and 
the Intelligence Community.  The period witnessed a transition from what had been a 
supportive relationship, in which Congress required little information or accountability, 
to one of distrust and a feeling that the Intelligence Community might actually pose a 
threat to American democracy.  Instead of acknowledging the positive attributes of the 
Intelligence Community, the congressional committees appeared intent on ferreting out 
abuses and mistakes.  Unfortunately, the issue also became another battleground between 
the executive branch and Congress over governmental power.  This period, which was 
one of turmoil for the Intelligence Community following the collapse of the former 
Soviet bloc, ended with further revelations of new abuses by the Intelligence Community.  
Approximately ten years after the original congressional investigations, the situation was 
repeated. 
In 1986, the world learned that high-ranking members of the Reagan 
administration were involved in selling arms to Iran and then diverting the funds to 
support Nicaraguan freedom fighters.  As had happened a decade earlier, the media storm 
forced the executive branch to launch an investigation to answer questions and, it was 
hoped, to stifle congressional inquiry.  The White House directed the Tower Commission 
to get to the bottom of the issue.  But as had happened with the Rockefeller Commission, 
the executive investigation did not satisfy the Congress.  Unlike the previous 
investigations, this time the House and the Senate formed a joint committee to examine 
the allegations. 
As one author put it, in the period after the Church and Pike Commissions 
congressional oversight moved from being performance-based to become a group of 
“cheerleaders for poorly managed, badly structured, and improperly funded intelligence 
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agencies.”  The age of consolidation also witnessed an ebb and flow of intelligence 
oversight.  When intelligence was absent from the media coverage, Congress operated 
minimal oversight.  When problems or mistakes were uncovered, like the failure to 
predict India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests or the Iran-Contra Affair, Congress instigated 
additional oversight initiatives.  Thus this period demonstrated a trend that began with the 
Hersh report in 1974: without media involvement and public outcry, Congress was 
unlikely to be proactive in examining the operations of the Intelligence Community.   
E.   THE AGE OF REEVALUATION (2001 -) 
What is the future of intelligence oversight?  The 9/11 Commission has proposed 
significant changes in the Intelligence Community that could have a meaningful impact 
on intelligence oversight.  The recommendation that has received the most press is the 
creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), envisioned as the ultimate overseer 
of the vast Intelligence Community.  The power consolidated in this one office could 
force standardized procedures, budget controls, and communication across all the 
intelligence agencies.  This would require a significant change by the Defense 
Department (DoD), which currently controls the lion’s share of the Intelligence 
Community’s budget and is likely to provide stiff resistance to change.  Another 
recommendation, receiving far less media attention, is that Congress must revamp its 
oversight procedures.  The commission recommended the creation of a Joint Intelligence 
Committee similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or some other sort of 
streamlining of congressional oversight procedures.  Ironically, the idea of a Joint 
Intelligence Committee was also made thirty years ago, when the Senate was first 
considering how to oversee intelligence affairs.  The 9/11 investigators also noted that 
their other recommendations “will not work if congressional oversight does not change 
too.  Unity of effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by divided 
congressional oversight.”1   
What lessons can we take from previous investigations and reform proposals that 
will aid in the implementation of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations?  All of the 
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s failed to prevent further abuses and intelligence failures.  
Despite increased congressional oversight, the Intelligence Community failed to predict 
                                                 
1 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 420. 
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the fall of the Shah of Iran, warn of the Indian nuclear test, or the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union.  It will be interesting to see if the proposed 9-11 reforms are able to 
prevent future intelligence failures, to combat incomplete information, or to penetrate 
enemy secrecy.  Is the United States Congress willing to step into an oversight role that 
will implicate them in any potential intelligence failures? 
F.   OTHER EXAMINATIONS 
This is not the first, nor will it be the last, evaluation of intelligence oversight.  
Peter Gill developed a concept of measuring intelligence embeddedness in society, which 
can be used to examine an Intelligence Community and evaluate the degree of autonomy 
and penetration that the security apparatus has attained at different times. The Gill model 
was based on terminology developed by William Keller in his study of the Intelligence 
Community’s abuse of power between 1950 and 1970.  Keller identified four types of 
security states.2  Gill adapted Keller’s work making it a tool to measure domestic 
intelligence organizations.  In his book Policing Politics, Gill defines autonomy as “those 
processes by which the secret state agencies resist the encroachment of other state 
agencies and citizens.”3  He defines penetration as “variety of techniques by which the 
secret state carries out its surveillance and supervision of other agencies and society in 
general.”4 In the model, an Intelligence Community that has a low degree of autonomy 
and low penetration into society is described as a Domestic Intelligence Bureau.  A 
political police state is a state in which the Intelligence Community has a medium level 
of autonomy and a medium level of societal penetration.  The final level identified by 
Gill is the independent security state, in which the Intelligence Community operates with 
a high degree of autonomy and has a high degree of penetration within the state.5  A 
graphic depiction of the Gill Model can be found in Figure 1.  The model was further 
improved by Kenneth Dombroski of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif., 
who converted it to a scale.  The purpose of the model is to answer central question “does 
the government control the agency, or is the agency essentially autonomous in its targets, 
                                                 
2 William W. Keller, The Liberal and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989), 14-15. 
3 Peter Gill, Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State (London: Frank 
Cass, 1994), 83. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid, 82-83. 
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its methods of gathering information and its use of countering methods?”6  
Unfortunately, because of its focus solely on domestic intelligence organizations like the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations or the British Security Service (MI5) the Gill Model is 
not well suited for this study. 
 
Figure 1.  Peter Gill’s Oversight Model (from Policing Politics)  
 
Frank J. Smist also did a lengthy study of intelligence oversight, but his focus was 
to examine congressional oversight within the framework of an “intuitional model” and 
an “investigative model.”  His studies lead him to the conclusion that Congress’s 
oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community was investigative in nature until 1976 and 
the establishment of the Senate and House permanent intelligence oversight committees, 
at which time the nature of oversight was transformed into intuitional oversight.  He 
defines the difference between the two versions of congressional oversight as 
“institutional oversight,” which “sees oversight as a cooperative relationship between the                                                  
6 Gill, 79. 
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legislative and executive branches,” and “investigative oversight” which sees oversight 
“as involving an adversarial relationship between the legislative and executive 
branches.”7  In the second edition of his book, Smist tracks oversight up 1994, where he 
indicates, “Although structures and missions undoubtedly will evolve, the Intelligence 
Community and congressional overseers have important tasks to perform as the world 
inches closer to the twenty-first century.”8 
Another useful study was conducted by L. Britt Snider, as part of the CIA’s 
Center for the Study of Intelligence; he examined oversight within the context of 
information-sharing between the Intelligence Community and Congress.  The Snider 
document discusses oversight changes from 1947 to 1997, but those reforms are outlined 
to provide an understanding of Congress’s increasing demand for intelligence-sharing.  
His examination does not examine the various common themes and problems that run 
through the various ages of oversight.   
Kathryn S. Olmstead and Loch K. Johnson both tackle the topic, but within the 
narrow confines of the congressional investigations of the 1970s.  Johnson examines the 
era from an insider’s point of view in his award-winning Season of Inquiry.  Olmstead 
addressed the topic in her book, Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate 
Investigations of the CIA and FBI.  She examines the Church and Pike Commissions in 
reference to the recent resignation of President Nixon.  Olmstead states that “the book 
shows…the post-Watergate Congress may have been more assertive in many areas, but it 
was ultimately unwilling to shoulder its responsibilities for overseeing the Intelligence 
Community.”9 While a comprehensive review of the age of investigation, it does not 
delve into the later reform efforts or address new developments post-9/11.  
G.   OVERSIGHT ASSESSMENT TOOL  
Because the Gill model applies primarily to domestic intelligence organizations 
and their autonomy from all forms of oversight, not just congressional, it is not a good fit 
for this study; but the Gill Model does provide a foundation for examining intelligence 
                                                 
7 Frank K. Smist, Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community 1947-1994 (Knoxville: 
University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 21-22. 
8 Ibid, preface to the second edition. 
9 Kathryn S. Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government:  The Post-Watergate Investigations of the 
CIA and FBI (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 5.  
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oversight.  Throughout this document congressional oversight will be measured as low, 
medium, or high and scaled over time, to show relative changes over the various ages of 
oversight.  To better aid the reader to follow the variations of intelligence oversight 
across the time periods outlined above this study will use a measurement table that will 
depict the degree of congressional oversight in a given time period.  Use of a 
measurement, while subjective, will aid the reader in understanding the historical impact 
of these variations.  An example of the modified model can be referenced at Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Intelligence Community Measurement Model 
 
H.   CONCLUSION 
It could also be said, that by exercising greater control over military intelligence 
operations, the legislature exhibits what Samuel Huntington would refer to as objective 
civilian control of the military.10  The extensive involvement of military intelligence in 
                                                 
10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, Mass, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 83. 
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civilian information collection has the effect of involving the military in politics, because 
the collection efforts tend to target only the liberal anti-war elements of a society.  By 
aligning military intelligence efforts to only foreign collection and threats, Congress 
applied objective control and prevented the autonomy of the military Intelligence 
Community. 
As observed in this thesis, congressional intelligence oversight is an evolutionary 
process that is still evolving.  Initiated in a period of congressional ignorance and 
avoidance, oversight has become embedded in intelligence operations.  Originally a 
means to abrogate power abuses, oversight has improved intelligence processes, 
engendered greater public trust in the Intelligence Community, and protected citizens’ 
rights.  While the revelation of abuses of power brought the professionalism and 
appropriateness of intelligence operations into question, Congress’s comprehensive 
investigations restored public faith in the Intelligence Community.  Hopefully, the 9/11 
Commission’s report and recommendations will do the same, but these reforms have 
begun to encounter the same issues that limited the effectiveness of earlier oversight 
efforts.  It is ironic that several of the 9/11 Commission’s recommendations are identical 
to those made by the Church and Pike commissions almost thirty years earlier.  The latest 
rounds of oversight proposals differ greatly from the foundations of oversight in the 
1970s.  Begun as a protective measure, oversight now hopes to prevent intelligence 
failures and miscommunications.  Only time will tell if increased congressional 
involvement in the Intelligence Community can prevent national disasters such as Pearl 




II.   CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:  THE AGE OF TRUST AND 
IGNORANCE (1947-74) 
It is difficult for me to foresee that increased staff scrutiny of CIA operations 
would result in either substantial savings or a significant increase in available 
intelligence information…if there is one agency of the government in which we must take 
some matters on faith, without a constant examination it of its methods and sources, I 
believe this agency is the CIA.11  Senator Richard B. Russell, 1956 
 
 
After the formation of the Intelligence Community as we know it in 1947, what 
oversight mechanisms were in place?  Initially, oversight originated from the 
Constitution.  Congress’s inherent control over intelligence budgets and disbursement of 
funds was vested in the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and the House and 
Senate Armed Services Committees.  Initial oversight consisted of a few members of 
each committee having access to intelligence data and budget requests.  This arrangement 
evolved because the vast majority of the intelligence assets and interests were vested 
within the newly created Department of Defense.  From the intelligence communities’ 
creation until the mid 1950s, Congress chose to exercise very little oversight.  What little 
oversight that did occur was limited to a rubber-stamping of proposed budgets.  Pat M. 
Holt relates an early incident involving the CIA, when DCI Dulles presented plans for the 
CIA headquarters building.  The committee chairman receiving the briefing commented 
that it looked like a very nice building and must cost $25 million.  Dulles countered by 
saying, “Well, no Mr. Chairman, I’m afraid it’s going to cost $50 million.”  The response 
was, “My, my, that will be a nice building.”12  That was the end of the oversight of the 
issue.    
The U.S. Constitution provides for broad checks on the powers of the executive 
branch.  The primary congressional oversight mechanism derives from Section 9, Clause 
7, which grants Congress the power to dispense funds.  As one expert pointed out, “The 
power of the purse is the most basic of all congressional powers.  Congress can 
                                                 
11 Quoted in Smist, 6. 
12 Pat M. Holt, Secret Intelligence and Public Policy: A Dilemma of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: 
CQ Press, 1995), 209. 
12 
effectively block any activity of which it disapproves, intelligence or otherwise, by a 
simple provision stating, ‘notwithstanding any provision of laws, no funds may be 
expended for X.’”13  Despite its oversight authority, for many years Congress showed a 
profound lack of interest in monitoring the Intelligence Community.  Congress 
reluctantly entered into the business of intelligence oversight only after the revelation of a 
series of intelligence failures in the 1960s and further abuses in the 1970s.14  
Prior to the 1970s, intelligence oversight was perfunctory and uncoordinated.  The 
responsibility for the oversight of intelligence operations was divided among four 
separate congressional committees: the House and Senate Armed Service Committees, 
and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.  While the committees had 
oversight authority, they made little effort to exercise that authority and no real effort to 
coordinate efforts between the various organizations.  They could require the Intelligence 
Community to answer for its actions or provide information on forthcoming operations, 
but they often failed to do so.   
There were also subcommittees on intelligence within the Armed Services 
Committees, but they rarely met.  Documentation indicates that in some years the 
subcommittees met as little as once a year for a couple of hours.  During this period, 
more than two hundred resolutions were introduced to improve congressional oversight, 
few made it out of committee, and none were passed.  Specific intelligence oversight 
could be as limited as twenty-four hours’ worth of meetings over the course of a year15.  
Congress’s lack of interference and oversight derived from a pervasive belief that 
Congress could not hinder intelligence activities that it knew nothing about.  There was 
also a general recognition of Congress’s overall lack of understanding of intelligence 
operations and a belief that whatever the Intelligence Community was doing was required 
to protect the nation.   
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During this period, the U.S. legislature suffered from “a marked lack of 
curiosity.”16  For example, when CIA Director (DCIA) James R. Schlesinger attempted 
to inform a leading senator, John Stennis, a senior member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, about operations overseas, he was told, “No, no, my boy, don’t tell me.  Just 
go ahead and do it, but I don’t want to know.”17  This typified congressional oversight 
during the period: a “hands off” approach that ended when the media brought to light a 
series of abuses.  
A.   SENATE MAKES AN ATTEMPT AT OVERSIGHT 
While on the surface it appears that Congress did little to enact any sort of 
oversight prior to the discovery of abuses in the mid 1970s, that is not quite the case.  
There had been minor initiatives to develop oversight, led by Senator Mike Mansfield of 
Montana.  Beginning in 1952, he regularly introduced legislation designed to create a 
joint congressional committee to oversee the Intelligence Community, but his efforts 
were rebuffed.  The Congress apparently saw little need to investigate or alter the existing 
relationship with the Intelligence Community.  Only in one year out of several was 
Mansfield able to get his oversight proposal out of committee to a vote.  It was rejected, 
27 in favor, 59 against.18  In opposing the resolution Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts 
noted that “at least twice a year” the CIA met with the Armed Services Committee and 
“at least once a year” with the Appropriations Committee.  Additionally, he stated: 
It is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA officials to speak to 
us.  Instead it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek 
information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a Member 
of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I believe it to 
be my responsibility to have it because it might involve the lives of 
American citizens.19  
 
How scant was oversight prior to the congressional investigations?  On the whole, 
the CIA’s appearances on the Hill, even before “its committees,” were relatively rare.  As 
late as 1968, for example, CIA records reflect only one briefing that year to the House 
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Armed Services Committee, three to the House Appropriations Committee, and two each 
to the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee.  
Attendance typically was limited to congressional members only, and often no record of 
the proceedings was kept.  Sometimes, reportedly, no questions at all were asked.20   
Efforts to initiate some sort of oversight popped up occasionally, mostly in 
response to some sort of intelligence-based failure or public outcry.  This happened after 
the U2 shoot-down over the Soviet Union, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and after 
allegations of CIA involvement in the Chilean elections of 1970, among others.  But they 
were rejected for a variety of reasons.  The quote below is typical of the congressional 
mindset of the period. 
 
It is difficult for me to foresee that increased staff scrutiny of CIA 
operations would result in either substantial savings or a significant 
increase in available intelligence information . . . If there is one agency of 
the government in which we must take some matters on faith, without a 
constant examination of its methods and sources, I believe this agency is 
the CIA.21  
 
B.   OPERATION CHAOS 
Congressional oversight would have likely remained minimal had the executive 
branch not misused the foreign intelligence-gathering system domestically for political 
purposes.  What was the impetus for moving the members of the Intelligence 
Community, who were to be focused on foreign collection, toward domestic operations?  
Concerned that the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover was not providing him with unbiased 
information, President Johnson directed the CIA to provide more information on anti-
Vietnam War protests.  The CIA developed two projects to collect information at college 
campuses, the hotbed of the protest movement.  One was designed to warn CIA recruiters 
of potential protests and mostly co-opted campus administrations; the other was designed 
to ferret out information on protests directed at CIA facilities.  Both involved infiltrating 
student organizations, sharing information with local police (sometimes in exchange for 
needed equipment), and participation in local police activities.  The two programs were 
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later merged under the title Operation Chaos.  It was at the behest of the executive branch 
and to support executive agendas that the CIA then became involved in domestic 
intelligence operations, but they were not the only member of the Intelligence 
Community to do so.  
C.   THE ARMY STEPS OUT OF LINE 
The issue of oversight began to take on new urgency in the early 1970s.  Issues 
that had previously been ignored or seen as minor deviations began to pile up.  One of the 
first indications that there were significant problems within the Intelligence Community 
came in January 1970.  A former army intelligence officer, Christopher H. Pike, 
disclosed in the Washington Monthly that since the late 1960s the army had been 
extensively involved in surveillance of U.S. citizens.  The media firestorm over this issue 
forced the civilian army leadership to issue orders prohibiting such investigations, but the 
orders were vague and not always followed.  Investigations discovered that the army’s 
civilian leadership had been attempting to rein in the army surveillance effort since 1968, 
but had met with stiff resistance within the military community.  Since September 1968, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze had denied the army’s military leaderships’ 
requests to expand the number of intelligence billets to facilitate greater involvement in 
surveillance.  Shortly after this denial, Army Undersecretary David McGifferet expressed 
concern whether the army’s domestic intelligence collection effort was “worth the 
effort.”  In early 1969, the undersecretary further expressed his disagreement with the 
army’s collection program and stressed his belief that domestic intelligence collection 
would best be performed by civilian law enforcement agencies.  He instituted a 
requirement that he be fully informed of any domestic covert or overt surveillance 
activities.  His directives were never fully implemented, partly due to resistance and 
partly due to an anticipated change in leadership.22   
Due to the media and political uproar over the 1970 Pike article the army 
rescinded its collection plan, but the collection effort continued.  The new army policy 
limited the army from collecting information on “unaffiliated” persons and focused 
collection on “threats” such as “subversion of loyalty, discipline, or morale, of the 
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Department of Defense military or civilian personnel.”23  A later investigation found that 
this wording was open to broad interpretation, which furthered the opportunity for 
abuses.  The army was not the only DoD branch to be involved in questionable 
intelligence practices, but it was the one with the most egregious violations.  Despite 
those abuses, however, congressional oversight did not change.  Army civilian 
intelligence gathering continued until more flagrant and extensive violations were 
uncovered a few years later.  Nonetheless, at the time, the army’s involvement in 
domestic intelligence gathering did not appear widespread and did not garner the public 
outrage that would punctuate the oversight efforts begun in 1974.  
D.   INTELLIGENCE ABUSES AND FAILURES 
What finally fractured the complacent relationship that had marked the early years 
of congressional intelligence oversight?  As was noted in the introduction, the nature of 
intelligence oversight within the United States changed drastically after December 1974, 
when the New York Times published a report outlining the CIA “Family Jewels.”  The 
“jewels” comprised a 663-page document outlining questionable activities and practices 
by the CIA.  This list had been internally collected at the request of the incoming CIA 
director, William Colby.  The document indicated that the CIA may have been involved 
in assassination attempts, break-ins, human experimentation, wiretaps, and domestic 
spying. 
The resulting public outcry initiated a wave of investigations designed to establish 
and document the Intelligence Community’s activities.  Both houses of Congress and the 
executive branch opened investigations.  The committees—the Senate Select Committee 
to Study Government Operations in Respect to Intelligence Activities and the House 
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities were more commonly named for their 
leadership: the Senate committee came to as known as the Church Committee, the House 
investigation, as the Pike Committee.  The investigations originally centered on CIA 
involvement in assassination plots against multiple international political leaders, 
including Fidel Castro, Vietnam leader Ngo Dinh Diem, General Rene Schneider of 
Chile, and Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier.  In addition, the Church Committee uncovered 
evidence that the CIA, FBI, and U.S. Army Intelligence had been involved in 
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surveillance and infiltration of anti-Vietnam-war protest organizations and political 
organizations that were unfriendly to the administration.  The commission found the 
Intelligence Community had:  
• Opened nearly a quarter of a million first-class letters between 1953-1973, 
producing a CIA computerized index of nearly one and one-half million names.  
• At least 130,000 first class letters were opened and photographed by the FBI 
between 1940-1966, in eight U.S. cities. 
• Some 300,000 individuals were indexed in a CIA computer system and separate 
files were created on approximately 7,200 Americans and over 100 domestic 
groups during the course of CIA's Operation CHAOS (1967-1973).   
• Millions of private telegrams sent from, to, or through the United States were 
obtained by the National Security Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret 
arrangement with three United States telegraph companies.  
• An estimated 100,000 Americans were the subjects of United States Army 
intelligence files created between the mid 1960's and 1971.24   
 
These activities had been undertaken without ever pursuing legal authorization.  
The investigation of the army revealed military intelligence surveillance of the National 
Organization for Women, Martin Luther King, Senator Adlai Stevenson, Dr. Benjamin 
Spock, and many other prominent organizations and leaders, as well as ordinary citizens 
who had simply expressed political opinions deemed inappropriate by military officials.  
The investigation concluded that the military had also violated the Posse Comitatus Act 
of 1878, which expressly forbids the military from being used to “execute the law.”  
One aspect of concern in the Senate investigations was the lack of complete 
contrition on the part of the intelligence-gathering abusers.  Many felt that their actions, 
though a violation of civil rights, were justified by what was seen as a “greater good” for 
national security.  For a example, one witness from the Church Commission’s hearings, 
concerning illegal mail-opening, testified: “I think this mail that we are talking about has 
already been intercepted by the Soviet Union and the Russian intelligence 
service…personally, if I had a letter opened from the Soviet Union, I would not object 
because I would not mind the FBI knowing what the Russian intelligence service 
knows.”25  This is only one example of the consequential ethics being applied to the 
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situation, in which the ends are used to justify the means.  The Senate commission, 
however, did not agree with and refused to accept such assessments of the situation. 
E.   CONCLUSIONS 
It is important to understand how limited oversight was during the post-war time 
period until the mid 1970s.  Without a sense of where things started, it is difficult to 
determine the challenges that reform efforts faced or to measure how far oversight has 
progressed.  L. Britt Snyder related how limited oversight was: “[in] the early years, we 
practically had to beg them to hold hearings.  Years would go by sometimes without any 
hearing at all being held on the Agency’s budget.”26  For the time period outlined in this 
chapter, the degree of congressional oversight is rated as low.  This assessment is based 
on how oversight was divided among multiple congressional committees with no one 
committee having an overall span of control.  Also, oversight could be limited to as little 
as twenty-four hours’ worth of meetings over a full year, but, most important, oversight 
was limited because Congress had not interest in monitoring the community. The degree 
of independence granted the Intelligence Community had the potential to subvert the 
goals of the Intelligence Community from protection of the American populace to being a 
tool of the political elite.  The marking in Figure 3 outlines the status of intelligence 
oversight throughout the period.  That delineation would not change until after the 
investigations covered in the next chapter. 
While Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and others may have tried to use the 
Intelligence Community to keep tabs on the popular will or to promote their own political 
goals, other freedoms, particularly those of the press, kept the Intelligence Community 
from evolving into a political police organization or an independent security agency 
capable of promoting its own political agenda.   
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III.   CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:  THE AGE OF 
INVESTIGATION (1975-1980) 
In light of the record of abuse revealed by our inquiry, the Committee is not 
satisfied with the position that mere exposure of what has occurred in the past will 
prevent its recurrence. Clear legal standards and effective oversight and controls are 
necessary to ensure that domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the 
democratic system it is intended to protect. – Church Commission Report 
 
In January 1975, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations 
with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Commission) was chartered; it 
concluded its investigation in April of 1976.  This was a relatively swift turnaround, 
especially given the years of research and effort that were to be spent some thirty years 
later on a similar investigation after 9/11.  The Church Commission was chartered with 
two broad goals: to investigate the alleged abuses of all the intelligence services and to 
propose legislative and executive corrections.  The commission validated many of the 
allegations that had been laid out in the press for both the CIA and DoD.  While the 
investigation had originally focused on problems with the CIA, the media refocused 
interest in the military’s involvement with the CIA domestic collection program, the U.S. 
Army’s continuing participation in domestic intelligence gathering, and violations by the 
National Security Agency. 
While the Senate was establishing oversight through the investigations and 
recommendations of the Church Commission, things were not going as smoothly in the 
House.  Initially, the House formed a committee under the leadership of Representative 
Nedzi, but that committee disbanded after the leadership resigned over a dispute with the 
membership.  The Nedzi Commission was replaced by an investigation headed by 
Representative Pike of New York.  The Pike Commission recommended that the House 
establish its own permanent intelligence committee and that there should also be closer 
fiscal controls imposed on the Intelligence Community.  In addition, the report 
recommended that the overall budget figure should be public (a stipulation that, in 2005, 
is still being recommended and avoided by the Intelligence Community) and that 
transfers and reprogramming of intelligence funds should be subject to approval by 
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congressional committees.  Moreover, the Pike Commission felt that the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) should have the same authority to investigate and audit 
intelligence agencies as it had over other agencies.  The commission also recommended 
the creation of a foreign operations subcommittee in the National Security Council, to 
deal with covert action, hazardous collection, and a major reorganization of the 
Intelligence Community, which would separate the Director of Central Intelligence from 
the CIA and the National Security Agency from the Defense Department.  Lastly, the 
commission recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency should be abolished.  As 
is well know, none of those measures to reorganize the Intelligence Community were 
enacted; however, the House did create a permanent intelligence committee in, July of 
1977.      
A.   CHURCH COMMISSION FINDINGS 
The Church Commission found that the military had participated in police raids, 
regularly exchanged intelligence reports, and released military investigative files on 
civilians and citizen organizations to local law enforcement.27  The commission 
uncovered evidence that, even after 1971, when the Defense Department restricted 
military participation in domestic intelligence collection activity, all three services, the 
army, the navy, and the air force, had continued their involvement.  For example, 
evidence showed that the air force initiated the tracking of civilian groups in San Diego 
in anticipation of potential requirements for the 1972 Republican Convention.  In 
addition, the hearings found several army units had directly disobeyed a DoD directive to 
destroy existing files on “unaffiliated” persons.  Instead, they turned over the information 
to local law enforcement.  As the Church Commission’s report concluded, the “extreme 
breadth of intelligence activity is inconsistent with the principles of our Constitution 
which protect the rights of speech, political activity, and privacy against un’justified’ 
governmental intrusion.”28  The Senate Commission’s report included shocking details 
which outlined that “the CIA had placed the names of 1.5 million potentially ‘subversive’ 
Americans in a computer database as a result of its mail-opening program; the agency 
had also opened files on more than 7,000 Americans during its domestic spying 
                                                 




operation.  The CIA and FBI together had opened 380,000 letters, while the FBI had 
undertaken 500,000 investigations of dissidents without winning any convictions.”29 
B.   CHURCH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Church Committee issued its report in several installments, each with 
multiple recommendations.  The first report, Foreign and Military Intelligence, included 
eighty-seven recommendations.  In the second report, Intelligence and the Rights of 
Americans, the committee proposed ninety-six improvements.  Given the limited scope 
of this study, only a few of the more important recommendations are presented here.  The 
most significant proposal directed that the Senate establish a permanent oversight body.  
In addition, the new oversight body should have budget oversight over the entire 
Intelligence Community and Senate approval must occur before funds are expended on 
covert operations.  The Church Committee also wanted the National Security Act of 1947 
amended to assign roles for the individual members of the Intelligence Community and 
recommended that the CIA, National Security Agency, Internal Revenue Service, and 
U.S. Post Office be barred from any domestic intelligence activities.  They proposed a 
ban on political assassination and the use of the Intelligence Community to subvert 
foreign governments and a prohibition on using the media or clergy to aid in intelligence 
collection.  In part because of the negative circumstances surrounding the Pike 
Committee report and partly due to a swing in public opinion, many of the Senate’s 
recommendations floundered.  The Senate did establish an oversight committee, but with 
limited budget power.  Many of the other recommendations were incorporated into an 
executive order. 
C.   PIKE COMMITTEE 
To some degree, the House’s investigation into intelligence abuses was less 
successful than the similar efforts in the Senate.  The original commission under 
Congressman Nedzi was disbanded due to party politics, and a second committee was 
formed under the leadership of Otis Pike.  The Pike Committee did not issue a formal 
report, although a version was eventually published in the open press.  The committee 
was allowed, however, to publish its twenty overall recommendations, several of which 
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were repetitive of the Church Commission recommendations.  Many would reappear 
during further congressional investigations.   
The commission recommended that the intelligence budget be declassified, and 
that the executive branch clearly define the role of the National Security Agency.  The 
committee recommended a prohibition against the transfer of monies between the various 
intelligence entities and a revamping of the role of the DCI, converting that position from 
one in charge of a single agency to more of a coordinating/controlling authority over the 
entire Intelligence Community.  The DCI would be charged with coordinating all the 
intelligence agencies under his jurisdiction, eliminating duplication, and evaluating 
performance and efficiency.  It was also anticipated that he would have some budget 
review authority.  The committee recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) be abolished and that its concerns be divided between the CIA and the office of the 
Secretary of Defense.  The committee proposed an Inspector General for the entire 
Intelligence Community and a codification of classifying and declassifying data.  
Additionally, panel member Les Aspin recommended splitting the CIA into two 
organizations, one devoted to analysis, the other to covert operations.  Even at this early 
juncture, committee members recognized that having both the analysis and the covert 
operations functions within a single organization created a conflict of interest.   
Why wasn’t the Pike Report ever formally published?  The failure to publish was 
due in part to executive wrangling, disagreement within the House as to the content, and 
Congressman Pike’s agreement with the Ford administration.  Kathryn Olmstead also 
cites a growing lack of congressional interest in oversight as part of the reason the report 
was suppressed.  Fearful of being accused of endangering national security, the House 
decided to allow the president to determine the report’s release, thereby relinquishing its 
responsibility for any potential release of classified information.  The executive, to 
prevent the damming information in the report from being made public (despite press 
leaks of much of the information), denied its publication. (Note: We have not seen a 
similar limitation of release of findings in the post-9/11 period.) 
It may have been the difficulties surrounding the publication of the Pike 
Commission report that pushed the Congress back into its reluctance to perform needed 
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intelligence oversight.  The publication of the report in the Village Voice, in direct 
violation of congressional mandates, led to a new media firestorm, negative public 
opinion, and further congressional investigations.  The victim of this situation was the 
much-needed oversight and the well-founded proposed reforms. 
D.   THE HUGHES-RYAN AMENDMENT 
So what changes to oversight were enacted during the 1974-1980 time period?  
Congress’s first move to enact an intelligence oversight measure was the Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment, which amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.  An immediate 
reaction to the Times’ publication of the intelligence abuses, the act would require that 
“no appropriated funds could be ‘expended by or on the behalf of the Central Intelligence 
Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended for obtaining 
necessary intelligence.’”30 It further called for presidential approval of any covert action 
and for the executive to report those activities to the appropriate congressional 
committees in a timely fashion.  Congress considered “timely” to be within days of the 
activities.  The Hughes-Ryan Amendment was important: it demonstrated to the 
executive that the legislature had a role in intelligence oversight and, given proper 
motivation, was willing to exercise that role.  The amendment garnered some criticism 
because the original amendment had called for notification of eight separate committees.  
Members of the Intelligence Community feared that the Congress lacked the sensitivity to 
keep such information classified.  They also had genuine concerns about briefing a large 
number of members on such highly sensitive activities.  Their fears were somewhat eased 
therefore by the establishment of the Senate and House Select Committees on 
Intelligence, which limited reporting to those committees.  
E.   EXECUTIVE REACTION TO CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS 
President Gerald Ford summed up the executive branch’s feelings about the 
congressional reforms, when he stated “the sensationalized public debate over legitimate 
intelligence activities endangered the nation…it ties our hands while our potential 
enemies operate with secrecy, with skill and with vast resources.  An investigation must 
be conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch to avoid crippling a national 
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institution.”31  In response to its own investigation and the recommendations of the two 
congressional committees, the White House issued a series of Executive Orders, one by 
each of the three presidents in office from 1975 to 1981.  The first was issued during the 
Ford administration, likely in an effort to stave off further congressional demands for 
oversight of intelligence operations. 
On February 18, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905, United 
States Foreign Intelligence Activities, which specifically delineated the domestic and 
foreign responsibilities assigned to the various intelligence agencies and designated an 
executive-level oversight board.  It also directed inspector generals within the various 
community organizations to be responsible for regular reporting of questionable oversight 
activities.  Executive Order 11905 was superseded on January 24, 1978, by EO 12026, 
issued by President Jimmy Carter, which directed the commission of an Oversight Board 
and the board to report to the president at least quarterly.  It also vested the individual 
intelligence organization’s internal inspector generals with the responsibility for 
monitoring and reporting intelligence oversight issues, a provision to “keep the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate fully and currently informed concerning 
intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities which are the 
responsibility of, or engaged in, by such department or agency.”:  
 
1-602. National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget. The Director of 
Central Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, 
have full and exclusive authority for approval of the National Foreign 
Intelligence Program budget submitted to the President…develop the 
consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget and present it 
to the President through the Office of Management and Budget…shall 
have full and exclusive authority for reprogramming National Foreign 
Intelligence Program fund. 32  
 
In December 1981, President Ronald Reagan issued the final Executive Order to 
be issued on the subject.  The Reagan Executive Order outlined the roles and 
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responsibilities of the various intelligence agencies and somewhat relaxed some of the 
restrictions on covert operations outlined in the Carter document.  This document has 
stood the test of time, as it has not been superseded.  It directs the various intelligence 
heads to cooperate with the Congress and to perform such reporting as is required by 
Title 50 and by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and in accordance with the National 
Security Act of 1947 (as amended).  Despite the congressional recommendations and the 
directives in all three EOs, the DCI’s overall budget authority was limited to making 
recommendations to the president and control of the budget for his own organization.  
Legislation to change the intelligence budgetary system has never been passed. 
F.   THE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1980 
The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 required the heads of the intelligence 
agencies to keep the oversight committees “fully and currently informed” of their 
activities, including “any significant anticipated intelligence activity.”  Detailed ground 
rules were established for reporting covert actions to Congress, in return for a limitation 
of the number of congressional committees receiving notice of covert actions to the two 
oversight committees.  This act established the SSCI and the HPSCI as the primary 
congressional intelligence oversight mechanisms and required the Intelligence 
Community provide Congress with prior notification of “significant anticipated 
activities.”  The act also provided for a more limited version of congressional reporting. 
In the event that the president was reluctant to inform the full membership of the two 
oversight committees of a pending operation, he could inform just eight members of 
Congress: the majority and minority leader of both chambers and the majority and 
minority leaders of the oversight committees. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 
superseded the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974.  
G.   ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
It is noteworthy that none of the intelligence problems of the 1960s and 1970s 
were uncovered by internal oversight mechanisms.  Rather, all were brought to light by 
the media and the legislative branch’s investigations.  After allegations of illegal 
intelligence activities were revealed in a series of New York Times articles, the executive 
branch directed the director of central intelligence to investigate the claims.  DCI Colby’s 
investigation indicated that all the abuses were in the past and that there was no need to 
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pursue the matter further.  In addition, an investigation of the previously disclosed army 
intelligence abuses had been perfunctory and had failed to modify the military’s 
behavior.  Given that the allegations of abuses followed so closely on the Watergate 
conspiracy, there was a reluctance to trust the executive to police itself.  In part due to 
this reason, the Senate was not easily dissuaded from investigating and thus formed its 
own investigative commission.  The media exposure of the Intelligence Community’s 
illegal antics and the public outrage over those activities forced the legislature and the 
executive departments to take action and begin a more active oversight role.  By 
thoroughly investigating the abuse allegations and by instituting oversight mechanisms 
Congress was able to heal some of the wounds and begin to repair the damaged 
reputation of the Intelligence Community. 
H.   MEASURING CHANGES IN OVERSIGHT 
In the post investigation era, Congress demonstrated a greater interest in 
intelligence and intelligence operations.  Numbers from the CIA History Staff Study 
demonstrate, that in 1975, prior to the creation of the intelligence oversight committees, 
the agency was required to present 188 substantive briefings and provide 204 classified 
intelligence products to Congress.  Conversely, in 1979, the CIA provided 420 briefings 
and approximately 1,800 products33.  During the Age of Investigation, oversight was at a 
high point.  The Church and Pike commissions spent months examining the Intelligence 
Community and proposed sweeping reforms.  The era witnessed the establishment of 
both permanent oversight committees.  The Church Commission proposed 183 separate 
improvements to oversight and intelligence operations.  The two committees had spent 
months delving into all aspects of the Intelligence Community.  They had uncovered 
assassination plots, mail openings, and use of the IRS against dissident communities, 
among other abuses.  This took oversight from the low level of involvement of the 50s 
and 60s to a high level.  That commitment of oversight began to wane in the months after 
the Church Commission’s final report.   
After the Church and the Pike commissions’ concluded their investigations and 
Congress established the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence, the reform 
movement seemed to run out of steam.  In 1978, the Senate proposed a National 
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Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act, a bill that would have established a director 
of national intelligence (DNI), as well as outlining roles, responsibilities, and restrictions 
on intelligence agencies’ “special activities.”  The bill was shelved after protest within 
the Congress, generated by the Intelligence Community, that it would hinder operations.  
A streamlined version of the bill was introduced in 1980, but that bill also failed to reach 
a vote.  Eventually, only three provisions of that reform effort were adopted: 1) 
modification of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 to limit the number of committees 
requiring notification of intelligence operations from seven to the two intelligence select 
committees; 2) partial release of the Intelligence Community from Freedom of 
Information Act requirements; and 3) the creation of criminal punishments for the 
intentional unauthorized disclosure of the identities of intelligence agents.34  Oversight 
had reached a high point in 1975-76 with three simultaneous commissions delving into 
the Intelligence Community and its operations.  By the end of the Age of Investigation 
congressional attention had turned to other matters and oversight was falling from its 
earlier highpoint.  These changes are depicted graphically in Figure 4.   
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Figure 4.  Assessment of Intelligence Oversight during the Age of Investigation 
 
I.   CONCLUSIONS 
The reforms of the 1970s established a system of checks and balances.  No longer 
would the Intelligence Community be responsible solely to the executive branch that it 
served.  Congress had put in place checks to ensure that accountability to the American 
people was entrenched in the system.  The lack of congressional controls had allowed the 
Intelligence Community and the executive it served to evolve from a tool to protect it 
citizens from internal and external threats to a threat itself.  Keller’s study of this period 
comes to the conclusion that by the time of the age of investigation, the Intelligence 
Community, particularly the domestic elements had evolved into “more a political police 
and an independent security state within the state.”35  The Intelligence Community was 
used to advance presidential political goals, by spying on dissidents and those who could 
be considered as threats to the administration and operated without any sort of check of 
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executive power, by the legislative or by the judicial branch.  Because the intelligence 
system was not accountable outside of its own realm, it had evolved from a security 
organization into a state of independent intelligence operations.  This period 
demonstrated that despite the span of control granted the Intelligence Community, it 
could be force to answer to the American public.  As Loch Johnson so accurately 
summed up the situation, “What brought the intelligence nightmares to an end was the 

















                                                 


























IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:  THE AGE OF 
CONSOLIDATION (1981-2001) 
 
“The agency’s stronger for it [oversight], the Congress is supportive to a degree 
that it would not be if it didn’t have that kind of responsibility” – Former DCI Colby37  
 
 
The era of consolidation began with the faint whisper that maybe the regulation 
and reform era of the 1970s had gone too far, and that all of the investigations had 
inhibited the nation’s security, not helped it.  This age opened on the heels of the 
Intelligence Community’s failure to predict the overthrow of the shah of Iran and the 
disastrous rescue mission of the Iranian hostages.  There was also public concern about 
security lapses and media revelations of covert identities, which while not caused by the 
congressional investigations, were linked to them by the Ford administration and the 
press.  This era witnessed a Congress that felt its intelligence reform efforts had gone far 
enough and a shift in oversight from one of watchdogs to one of advocates.  The general 
feeling was that measures had been established to deal with potential abuses and the 
Intelligence Community had been set straight on the role it was expected to play.   
During this time, the release of classified materials became a major concern.  As 
congressional oversight expanded, so too did congressional access to classified 
information and materials.  Early lapses in security generated concern that Congress was 
not conscientious enough about keeping the nation’s secrets safe.  Some members of 
Congress failed to adequately protect classified information and, in some cases, members 
used their access to leak information in ways that would enhance their own careers or 
would damage the administration.  This period was also marked by general concerns 
about the Intelligence Community’s involvement in covert actions, also known as 
“special activities.”  In the Iran-Contra affair, congressional oversight confronted 
executive privilege.  Additionally, Congress initiated efforts to improve intelligence 
operations through the investigations and recommendations of the Boran-McCurdy 
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initiative, the Aspin-Brown Commission, and the Intelligence Community in the 21st 
Century project. 
A.   IRAN-CONTRA 
In December 1982, Congress flexed it oversight muscle and checked the power of 
the executive branch by passing the Borland Amendment, fulsomely titled “A bill to 
amend the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983 to prohibit United States 
support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and to authorize assistance, 
to be openly provided to governments of countries in Central America, to interdict the 
supply of military equipment from Nicaragua and Cuba to individuals, groups, 
organizations, or movements seeking to overthrow governments of countries in Central 
America.” As the text explained, the motivation was to provide   
an amendment to prohibit covert assistance for military operations in 
Nicaragua and to authorize overt interdiction assistance.  The overt 
interdiction assistance consists of assistance furnished by the President on 
terms he may dictate to any friendly country in Central America to enable 
that country to prevent the use of its territory for the transfer of military 
equipment from or through Cuba or Nicaragua or any other country. The 
assistance must be overt. For this overt aid $30,000,000 is provided for FY 
’83 and $50,000,000 is provided for FY ’84.38  
 
The amendment, which specifically prohibited the federal government from 
providing covert aid to Nicaragua, was passed by a vote of 227 to 194.  It was intended to 
prevent the members of the Reagan administration from aiding the Contra movement “for 
the purposes of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua.”39  The executive branch and 
the CIA managed to avoid that proscription, however, by finding legal loopholes.  They 
interpreted the operations not as attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, but 
merely as harassing that government.  Those involved also chose to use contractors, 
rather than CIA employees, to perform operations, thereby allowing them to say that the 
federal government was not involved..  In addition, the administration claimed that 
because the amendment was part of an intelligence bill, the prohibition on helping the 
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contras did not apply to other federal organizations such as the National Security 
Counsel.   
Prohibited from funding the contras through federal means, the Reagan 
administration looked to other means to raise money for their support.  An elaborate 
scheme evolved in which arms brokered through Israel were sold to Iran with the profits 
funneled to the contras.  Out of this was born the Iran-contra affair, which presented a 
problem on several levels.  It demonstrated willingness by the executive branch to ignore 
the will of the Congress, and the arms sales to Iran violated the United States’ stated 
neutrality to the ongoing Iran-Iraq war. 
The Iran-contra affair might have slipped by unnoticed and unknown if it had not 
been for oversight protections afforded by the international media.  In November 1986, 
the Lebanese press disclosed the arms deals and their connection to the contra movement.   
This ignited a wave of investigations and allegations reminiscent of the Nixon/Watergate 
era.  In January 1987, in response to the allegations, Congress established two Select 
Committees charged with conducting a comprehensive investigation of the Iran-contra 
affair.  These were the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and 
the Nicaraguan Opposition, and the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms 
Transactions with Iran.  The committees found that the executive had deliberately 
avoided congressional reporting requirements for “special activities” and that the CIA in 
particular had manipulated intelligence data to subvert “democratic process.”40  Iran-
contra was a violation of the rules established by the Hughes-Ryan amendment and 
Executive Order 12333 to inform the congress in a timely manner of any covert action.  
In her book, Challenging the Secret Government, Kathryn Olmstead argues that it was 
the legislative reforms of the 1970s that made criminal the Reagan administration’s 
activities.  The Hughes-Ryan Amendment took activities like Iran-contra out of the realm 
of executive privilege and made them crimes.41 The change Iran-contra denoted was that 
there were now mechanisms in place to check this type of executive activity, if not 
always the will.   
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The Iran-contra affair was a direct challenge to the legislative oversight system.  
The Reagan administration had violated the guidelines emplaced by Congress.  Thus 
Congress decreed that, from that date on, certain members were to be informed of all 
covert actions, the reporting must be timely and presidential “findings” (determinations to 
use covert actions) must be in writing.  Three presidents further codified the requirement 
to notify Congress in Executive Orders.  During the Iran-contra investigations, Congress 
discovered that the White House had not only failed to pass on any information but, in 
some instances, had also failed to document its decisions.  Indeed, one presidential 
finding specifically directed the Director of Central Intelligence not to report a covert 
action to the Congress.  The investigative committee consensus was that the 
administration had deliberately sought loopholes to prevent congressional reporting.   
The National Security Act requires the reporting of arm sales of over one million 
dollars.  Two of the Iranian sales exceeded $10 million.  When asked why those activities 
were not reported to Congress in keeping with the National Security Act, the answer was 
that, since no single item exceeded $1 million, the act did not apply.  The activities 
clearly demonstrated that the Reagan administration did not want to restrict the 
operations, even though they violated both the law and congressional directives.  The 
president and high-ranking members of his administration completely disregarded the 
Congress’s role in checking executive power.  Congress concluded that Iran-contra did 
not result from inadequate oversight powers, but rather it was due to the administration’s 
deliberate attempts to bypass and effectively negate those powers.  In the end, the 
investigation committee concluded that Iran-contra “resulted from a failure of individuals 
to observe the law, not from deficiencies in existing law or in our system of 
governance.”42  Just as the investigations of the Church and Pike commissions and their 
recommendations had shaped Congress’s agenda for the following couple of years, the 
results of the Iran-Contra investigations drove the select committee’s program. 
B.   EXECUTIVE REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS 
During the early 1980s the executive branch continued to react to the Congress’s 
findings in the Iran-contra affair and its calls for oversight.  The Reagan administration 
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promulgated two new Executive Orders: EO 12333, which outlined the functions of the 
nation’s intelligence agencies, and EO 12334, which reestablished the Intelligence 
Oversight Board.  The president indicated that the orders were intended “to remove the 
aura of suspicion and mistrust that can hobble our nation’s intelligence efforts.”  As John 
Oseth points out, while EO 12333 outlined the conduct of intelligence operations, as did 
EO 12036, which it replaced, it does not use the word “restrictions.”  Oseth further 
categorizes the document as far more positive than two previous EOs, demonstrating an 
“affirmative attitude now dominant in the administration.”43    
Just as when the allegations of domestic abuse arose, the Executive Branch hoped 
to stave off Congressional inquiry by establishing its own commission.  The Tower 
Commission was chartered to investigate the Iran-Contra allegations.  It documented the 
allegations and provided recommendations to prevent similar problems from occurring in 
the future. As a result, President Reagan initiated a three-prong program:  “I’m taking 
action in three basic areas: personnel, national security policy, and the process for making 
sure that the system works.”  The administration hired new personnel for the chief of 
staff, national security advisor, and director of the CIA (DCIA).  Reagan also ordered a 
comprehensive review of covert operations and covert policies.  Lastly, he overhauled the 
National Security Council’s processes as per the Tower Commission’s recommendations.  
As for congressional oversight, Reagan stated, “I am also determined to make the 
congressional oversight process work. Proper procedures for consultation with the 
Congress will be followed, not only in letter but in spirit.”44  Congress has not always 
been fully informed as that promise indicates, however.  As one House intelligence 
committee member, Norman Mineta, put it, “we are like mushrooms, they keep us in the 
dark and feed us a lot of manure.”45 
C.   INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR 
The end of the Cold War presented new challenges for the Intelligence 
Community and its overseers.  Thus, in the early 1990s, Congress started another wave of 
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intelligence reform.  Both houses of Congress set forth reform measures intended to 
redirect the Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War era and to realign the 
intelligence structure in a manner similar to the Goldwater-Nichols restructuring of the 
Department of Defense.  This effort came to be known as the Boren-McCurdy initiative.  
Although the House and Senate proposals differed, they also had several 
recommendations in common:   
 
• The creation of a director of national intelligence (DNI) with budget authority and 
temporary transfer of personnel 
• The creation of two deputy directors of national intelligence (DDNIs)  
• The creation of a separate director of the CIA, subordinate to the new DNI, to 
manage the agency’s day-to-day collection and covert action capabilities  
• The consolidation of  analytical and estimative efforts of the Intelligence 
Community under one of the deputy DNIs 
• The creation of a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense 
(DoD) to collect, exploit, and analyze imagery  
• The authorization of the director of DIA to task defense intelligence agencies 
(DIA, NSA, and the new Imagery Agency) with collection requirements; and to 
shift functions, funding, and personnel from one DoD intelligence agency to 
another.46  
 
Unfortunately, this legislation did not pass, although some aspects of the Boran-
McCurdy initiative later appeared in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1994.  That 
legislation gave the DCI broader powers to coordinate intelligence collection activities 
and created the deputy DCI positions.  Responsibility for the failure of this reform effort 
is often placed on the Department of Defense and its supporters on the Armed Services 
Select Committees, which blocked the legislation that would have diminished DoD 
authority.  The DoD was particularly concerned that the legislation would have moved 
budgetary authority to the DNI, resulting in a potential loss of DoD command over 
military intelligence personnel.  This same issue would arise again in 2004. 
D.   BIPARTISAN EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE 
Another wave of oversight/reform commenced in the mid 1990s with two 
simultaneous investigations.  One was undertaken as a commission formed jointly by the 
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executive branch and the Senate:  the Commission on Roles and Capabilities of the 
Intelligence Community, which became known as the Aspin-Brown Commission.  The 
commission invited participation from the House Permanent Select Committee for 
Intelligence Oversight (HPSCI), but was turned down.  The House elected instead to 
form its own commission, known as The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century 
(IC21), which will be covered later.  
     Chartered in September 1994, the Apsin-Brown Commission was designed to 
examine the intelligence problems surrounding Somalia (according to Loch Johnson), the 
community’s direction at the end of the Cold War, and how to deal with the backlash 
from the Aldridge Ames scandal (according to L. Britt Snyder) and was to propose 
reforms.  It was made up of members of Congress, the executive branch, and others of 
their choosing.  Both the Senate and the White House had assessed the need to evaluate 
the Intelligence Community and had determined that a single commission representing 
both the executive and the legislature would avoid the cost and the duplication of two 
commissions investigating the same topic. The committee decided on four main tasks to 
determine:  
1. What are the intelligence needs of the United States in the post-Cold War 
world? 
2. What are the intelligence capabilities required to collect, analyze, and 
disseminate such information? 
3. To what extent do the existing capabilities compare with those needed to satisfy 
future requirements for intelligence? 
4. To the extent that existing capabilities fall short, what changes—organizational, 
managerial, programmatic, or budgetary—should be made?47 
 
While getting ready to publish their final report, members were urged to 
“Remember the underlying reason for the commission,” which Senator Warner stressed 
was “to restore confidence in intelligence.” Representative Goss agreed: “We shouldn’t 
paint such a black picture. I’m not trying to whitewash, but let’s tone this down.”48  Now 
that is pretty friendly oversight.  The commission did recommend releasing the overall 
budget figure, but could not agree on whether to cut or to stabilize intelligence spending.  
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At the same time, the HPSCI began a parallel effort.  It is during this investigation that 
we see a shift in the focus of congressional oversight.  Where before the effort had been 
to rout out misdeeds or to establish roles and structures, this new effort was more intent 
on shoring up the morale of a community rocked by spy scandals.  The shift in the 
congressional interpretation of its role as overseer is tell-tale in Senator Durenberger’s 
comment that “The purpose [of oversight] is to help intelligence, not to have an audit 
team sitting on the back of the [CIA] operations department.49   
E.   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
Although invited to participate in the Aspin-Brown examination of intelligence 
operations, the HPSCI preferred to undertake its own investigation, dubbed the 
Intelligence Community for the 21st Century (IC21), into the future of the Intelligence 
Community.  Many of the findings and recommendations from IC21 mirror those of the 
Aspin-Brown Commission.  However, in a major shift from all previous and future 
committees the IC21 did not propose the establishment of a joint congressional 
committee.   
 
There is no compelling reason to convert the current system to a joint 
committee. Congress’s record regarding safeguarding highly classified 
information is not perfect, but does not warrant this step.  Creating a joint 
committee would also require either the House or the Senate to alter its 
current arrangements for intelligence oversight, which has not had 
significant support in the past.  Finally, and most importantly, creating a 
joint committee for intelligence would continue to heighten the view that 
intelligence is something other than an accepted function of government, 
which tends to increase rather than complement oversight issues and 
problems.50  
 
Instead, the IC21 commission proposed to do away with some of the aspects of 
the congressional committees as “Select” committees.  The HPSCI investigation agreed 
that intelligence committee members should be appointed separately, but disagreed with 
the term limits.  It felt that term limits caused excessive turnover, especially of the 
chairmanship, and that the loss of intelligence-wise members was harmful to oversight.   
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Overall, the IC21 concluded that “effective oversight and an informed Congress are now 
considered among the expected norms of our system of government.  We believe that 
oversight, if carried out seriously and with a modicum of support from intelligence 
agencies, not only helps ensure greater executive branch effectiveness and propriety, but 
can also be a substantial force in rebuilding a sorely needed consensus to support 
intelligence agencies, programs and activities.”51  This investigation demonstrated a shift 
in intelligence oversight from an adversarial to more of an advocacy relationship.  A 
quote from the IC21 report shows a strong indication of the shift within the Congress 
from an overseer-watchdog to an overseer-supporter:  “Intelligence, unlike other federal 
programs, has no natural constituency; therefore, Congress plays a vital role in building 
public support.”52  
F.   MEASURING INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT 
How did the reforms of the 1970s and the consolidation of Congress’s oversight 
power affect the Intelligence Community’s position in society?  Oversight was not nearly 
as intrusive as during the Church Commission period.  There was one significant 
investigation into abuse and it revealed a fundamental weakness in congressional 
oversight: Congress is dependent on the Intelligence Community to tell them the truth 
about its activities.  Oversight during the Iran-contra period is rated as medium.  While 
outraged by the allegations and prompted to investigate, the results of the investigation 
did not motivate Congress to change its degree of oversight.  The report concluded that 
processes in place were sufficient, but it was the executive branch’s acceptance of 
congressional controls that had been challenged.  In the remainder of the period, 
investigative oversight became less prominent as the emphasis shifted from Congress as 
an intelligence watchdog to Congress as an intelligence supporter.  The Aspin-Brown and 
IC21 committees actively sought ways to boost the Intelligence Community morale.  
Additionally, the reason oversight was depicted with a downward emphasis waa the 
inability in the Age of Consolidation for Congress to pass legislation enacting their 
proposed reform measures.  Also, the medium level of congressional involvement is not 
intended to be interpreted as a negative.  It is likely that it is the appropriate level of 
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involvement for day-to-day community oversight.  Between 1980 and 2001, Congress 
was certainly more engaged than in the “era of trust,” and the Intelligence Community 
and the executive came to accept that involvement.  But it would be unreasonable and 
intrusive to expect Congress to maintain the constant vigilance and probing inquiries of 
the late 1970s.  A graphic depiction of this relationship can be found in Figure 5. 
 
 Figure 5.  Assessment of Oversight during the Age of Consolidation 
 
G.   CONCLUSIONS 
This period demonstrates the continued need for oversight, because the executive 
actively sought means and methods to avoid congressional controls.  While the 
executive’s activities were not domestically based, they demonstrated a willful disregard 
for oversight requirements.  An evaluation of intelligence oversight might have looked 
very different had the investigations of the early 1980s not demonstrated continued 
congressional interest in oversight.  One of the most disturbing aspects of the Iran-contra 
inquiry was the discovery that the Reagan administration had been planning to establish 
independent funding for “special activities” outside the congressional budgetary process.   
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Had that occurred, the executive branch would have possessed an independent funding 
source for covert operations with no possibility of a check by the legislature.  Had not the 
Congress chosen to exercise its oversight prerogative, we could have witnessed an 
Intelligence Community with the financial freedom to bypass congressional oversight.  
What does this time period show about intelligence oversight?  The oversight 
period between 1980 and 2001 demonstrates the maturing of the oversight process.  We 
see an executive that tests the system to determine its limits, but that also accepts 
correction when caught out-of-bounds.  The period also demonstrates a shift in the 
congressional mindset.  Oversight began as a punishment for misdeeds; it evolved into an 
accepted support and necessary evaluation of intelligence operations.  While it is 
understandable that the executive and the Intelligence Community would prefer to 
operate without having to answer to Congress, there is grudging acceptance of the 
oversight role and acknowledgement that, overall, it has made the Intelligence 
Community stronger and likely aided in reestablishing its credibility.  The Iran-contra 
affair revealed an inherent weakness in congressional oversight.  Oversight of security 
systems is only as effective as the information provided to the overseers by the 
community itself.  Intelligence oversight is dependent on the Intelligence Community and 
the executive abiding by the rules created by Congress.  If either the Intelligence 
Community or the executive chooses to conceal information, there is little recourse, 
except the media.  The age of consolidation demonstrated a growing if grudging 
acceptance of oversight.  In the words of former DCIA Colby, “The agency’s [CIA] 
stronger for it.  The Congress is supportive to a degree that it would not be if it didn’t 




                                                 

























V.   CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:  AGE OF REEVALUATION 
(2001 - ) 
In the perfect world, I believe we could create a domestic intelligence service that would 
have sufficient oversight that it would not infringe on our civil liberties…. I am very 
fearful that such an agency would have potential to infringe on our civil liberties. And 
therefore, I think we would have to take extraordinary steps to have active oversight of 
such an agency.” – Richard Clark in testimony to the 9/11 Commission. 
 
 
The post September 11th, 2001 time frame in regard to intelligence oversight is 
best termed as the age of Reevaluation.  The last few years have been marked by 
reevaluation, reforms, and redirection.  In the post-September 11th time period, there 
have been major investigations and many proposals, as well as some of the same type of 
wrangling experienced in the earlier ages of oversight.  Most worrisome, there have also 
been early reports of possible abuses.  Unlike the previous investigations, this time period 
has not focused on abuse, but on failure.  There were instances of intelligence failures in 
the 1980s and 1990s, but nothing that resulted in a major loss of American lives and, 
other than the bombing on 25 February 1993 at the World Trade Center, none were 
domestic.   
It is natural to seek a cause, a reason, for a tragedy or a disaster.  Where did the 
system go wrong?  What could have been done to prevent such a tragedy from occurring?  
What can be done to prevent it from happening again?  It is important to find something 
that can be corrected, to assure ourselves that by changes and reforms such a disaster as 
September 11 will never happen again.  The current age of oversight is focused on 
ensuring that oversight can prevent similar disasters befalling the nation.  The future of 
oversight can be determined by looking at the findings of the various commissions and 
their recommendations.  Only time will tell if the findings and the recommendations of 




A.   CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES INVESTIGATE 
In February 2002, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) formed the first ever 
joint-committee inquiry commission.  The commission has three primary goals: 
• To conduct a factual review of what the Intelligence Community knew or should 
have known prior to 11 September 2001; 
• To identify and examine systemic problems that may have impeded the 
Intelligence Community from learning of or preventing the attacks; and  
• To make recommendations to improve the Intelligence Community’s ability to 
identify and prevent future international terrorist attacks.54   
In December 2002 the commission delivered its final report.  The unclassified 
version is 858 pages long.  It identifies five factual findings, sixteen systemic findings, 
and three related findings and makes nineteen recommendations.  The report concludes 
that “No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections been 
drawn between these disparate pieces of information. We will never definitively know to 
what extent the Community would have been able and willing to exploit fully all the 
opportunities that may have emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence 
Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range 
of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing 
Usama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these United States on September 11th, 2001.”55  
What the congressional oversight committees’ report does reveal is what the 
commission termed “systemic” problems within the Intelligence Community that, if left 
uncorrected, “will continue to undercut the U.S. counterterrorism effort”56 and essentially 
jeopardize future security.  The congressional report indicates that even if the major 
proposed reforms had been implemented prior to 9/11, they may not have prevented the 
tragedy.  The commission made multiple recommendations for changes to the 
Intelligence Community, including the creation of a DNI, improvements to budgets, 
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better interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing, support to homeland defense, 
changes in intelligence collection, prioritization, and improved linguistic capabilities.  It 
also advised that the executive needs to update current Executive Orders to document 
security classification and aid in the sharing of intelligence, especially with state and 
local officials.  
The report’s fourteenth recommendation deals directly with the two congressional 
committees’ oversight responsibility:  “Congress should maintain vigorous, informed, 
and constructive oversight of the Intelligence Community.”  And “the best way achieve 
that goal” is to direct the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States (9/11 Commission) to examine a whole list of issues, including the intelligence 
budget, oversight committee membership, oversight committee structure, classification 
concerns, and “how Congressional oversight can best contribute to the continuing need of 
the Intelligence Community to evolve and adapt to changes in the subject matter of 
intelligence and the needs of policy makers.”57 
B.   THE 9/11 COMMISSION   
Despite the investigation undertaken by the two select committees, there 
continues to be a great push to establish a more public investigation into the 9/11 attacks. 
In late 2002, Congress created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (9/11 Commission) as part of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2003.  It 
was chartered to “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding 
the attacks, and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and immediate response 
to, the attacks.”58  President Bush initially felt that “the best place” for this type of 
investigation was with the intelligence committees, but he eventually supported the 
legislation to establish the bipartisan commission proposed by Congress.  The 
commission places most of the blame for failure to prevent the airline hijackings and their 
subsequent use as weapons of mass destruction on the Intelligence Community.  Their 
investigation uncovered major problems in intelligence sharing, Intelligence Community 
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focus, and oversight prohibitions.  Quotes from the report sum up the various issues.  The 
Commission found:  
• An almost obsessive protection of sources and methods by the NSA, and its focus 
on foreign intelligence, and its avoidance of anything domestic would, as will be 
seen, be important elements in the story of 9/11.   
• During the 1990s, tension sometimes arose, as it did in the effort against al Qaeda, 
between policymakers who wanted the CIA to undertake more aggressive covert 
action and wary CIA leaders who counseled prudence and making sure that the 
legal basis and presidential authorization for their actions were undeniably clear. 
• Secrecy, while necessary, can also harm oversight. The overall budget of the 
Intelligence Community is classified, as are most of its activities. Thus, the 
intelligence committees cannot take advantage of democracy’s best oversight 
mechanism: public disclosure. This makes them significantly different from other 
congressional oversight committees, which are often spurred into action by the 
work of investigative journalists and watchdog organizations.59 
 
C.   THE 9-11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 
The 9/11 commission report is 585 pages long and examines in detail the events 
preceding the attack on September 11th, as well as the actions taken on that day.  The 
report contains forty recommendations, only a few of which directly relate to the 
Intelligence Community or oversight of that community.  There are five 
recommendations that directly concern the Intelligence Community and its overseers.   
• The current position of Director of Central Intelligence should be replaced by 
a National Intelligence Director.  
• Information procedures should provide incentives for sharing, to restore a 
better balance between security and shared knowledge. 
• The president should lead a government-wide effort to bring the major 
national security institutions into the information revolution  
• Congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now 
dysfunctional.  Congress should address this problem.  We have considered 
various alternatives:  A joint committee on the old model of the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy is one.  A single committee in each house of 
Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities, is another. 
• Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and review for 
homeland security. 60 
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At this point, some progress has been made on the above recommendations.  
Congress, through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, created, and 
the president appointed, a Director of National Intelligence (DNI).  Unfortunately, he 
does not have the budget powers or the personnel controls the 9/11 commission 
envisioned and recommended.  This raises concerns about whether the office will be as 
influential as was hoped.  Former commission member John Lehman stated, “Our 
recommendations are not a Chinese menu.  They are a whole system. If all of the 
important elements are not adopted, it makes it very difficult for the others to succeed.”61  
The failure to vest the DNI with the powers the commission intended lies solely with the 
Department of Defense, which has a vested interest in keeping the majority of the 
intelligence budget under its own control.  Currently, 80 percent of the Intelligence 
Community’s budget is under DoD control.  This creates a major disincentive within the 
DoD support community for any substantive change. Unfortunately, without this type of 
change, problems that led to 9/11 may persist, as 9/11 commission member, Senator Bob 
Kerrey, noted, “I know that Secretary [of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld is going to oppose 
this, and if they win one more time, if the [Department of Defense] wins one more time, 
then next time there’s a dustup and there’s a failure, don’t call the director of Central 
Intelligence up here.  Kick the crap out of [the defense department] because they’re the 
one with the statutory authority over the budget.”62  
D.   9/11 COMMISSION COMMENTS ON OVERSIGHT 
One of the most significant 9/11 commission recommendations, but one that has 
received far less press than the creation of the DNI or the problems related to information 
sharing, was aimed directly at Congress.   
Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may 
be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is 
governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the 
American people will not get the security they want and need. The United 
States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee 
structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies oversight, 
support, and leadership…Tinkering with the existing structure is not 
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sufficient. Either Congress should create a joint committee for 
intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its model, or it 
should create House and Senate committees with combined authorizing 
and appropriations powers. Whichever of these two forms are chosen, the 
goal should be a structure—codified by resolution with powers expressly 
granted and carefully limited— allowing a relatively small group of 
members of Congress, given time and reason to master the subject and the 
agencies, to conduct oversight of the intelligence establishment and be 
clearly accountable for their work. The staff of this committee should be 
nonpartisan and work for the entire committee and not for individual 
members.”63   
Essentially, the commission found that the current oversight structure, with the 
House and the Senate having differing degrees of budgetary control, as well as the 
problem incurred with sharing the span of control with the appropriations committees and 
the armed services committees was dysfunctional. This language suggests that the 
commission may agree with a previous House recommendation to loosen the controls on 
the time limits imposed on a select committee.  The Intelligence Community in the 21st 
Century report recommended removing term limits on the intelligence committees to 
allow greater continuity and maximize expertise.  This recommendation was likely born 
out of the great turnover in committee chairmanships, a direct result of the term limits.  
Despite the 9/11 Commission’s specific emphasis that the American goal of 
greater security cannot happen without effective congressional oversight and that 
Congress is not capable of providing that oversight with its current rules and structure, 
there has been no modification of the existing oversight structure and no new design of 
congressional oversight.  The irony here is that the Church Commission made the same 
recommendations in the 1970s and also recommended that the new oversight mechanism 
be designed along the lines of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.  Essentially, as long 
as oversight functions are divided between the House and the Senate, the process will be 
fatally flawed.  Unfortunately for members of Congress, the greater their involvement in 
oversight, the more they open themselves to the political fallout when intelligence 
failures or abuses occur.  By maintaining a distant oversight role, Congress has been able 
to investigate and move to correct problems without being blamed when the system fails.   
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Another significant weakness of legislative oversight is, as Frank Smist put it, “It 
has no political benefit.  In fact, it is a vast political detriment.  The time it takes up.  You 
get no benefits from serving on the intelligence committee.  There are no pork barrel 
benefits to be obtained and no state issues involved.”64.  The same is true today.  
Membership on the select committees is unlikely to benefit members and could be seen 
as a detriment if there are further intelligence problems, especially if the failures or 
problems can be linked back to a lack of oversight or direction.  The work performed by 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and that proposed for any new oversight 
committee, would significantly aid national security. But due to security requirements, 
members are unable to advertise their contributions when running for reelection or 
attempting to validate their service in Washington.  This issue will have a great impact on 
whether or not Congress steps up to a more demanding role in oversight. 
E.   OVERSIGHT AND THE PATRIOT ACT 
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the Uniting and Strengthening 
America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 into law.  The PATRIOT Act gives sweeping 
new powers to both domestic law enforcement and international intelligence agencies and 
eliminates the checks and balances that previously gave courts the opportunity to ensure 
that such powers are not abused.  Most of the checks and balances were put in place after 
previous misuses of surveillance powers by the intelligence agencies were uncovered.  
For example, the media revealed in 1974 that the FBI and foreign intelligence agencies 
had spied on more than 10,000 U.S. citizens, including Martin Luther King Jr.  It is 
important to note, that while the USA PATRIOT Act increases police power to conduct 
domestic surveillance, it does not change the role of the military or the foreign 
intelligence bodies in relation to domestic intelligence gathering.  Since 9/11 and the 
implementation the USA PATRIOT Act, there have been major changes in intelligence 
operations within the United States.  Military air surveillance assets have been used to aid 
in forest fire observation and proposed as a survey tool after Hurricane Katrina.  Also, 
DoD intelligence personnel now work with the FBI and other law enforcement centers.  
While military intelligence agencies may not be directly involved in information 
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collection, they are, at the very least, aware of collection activities and have access to 
collection performed on American citizens and businesses.  These are technical violations 
of the prohibitions put in place in the 1970s.  So far these deviations have not been 
challenged; it appears that most citizens are willing to sacrifice personal privacy in order 
to improve domestic safety.  This may or may not change.  As the public becomes more 
comfortable with domestic terrorist threats, they may also become more concerned about 
the current and potential loss of privacy. 
Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act on 25 October 2001, just six weeks after 
the devastating attacks of September 11th.  It was signed into law the next day.  Title IX 
is the section of the document that impacts intelligence operations.  It includes eight 
segments that pertain to intelligence, two of which are relevant to intelligence oversight.   
 
 Sec. 904. Temporary authority to defer submittal to Congress of reports on 
intelligence and intelligence-related matters 
 Sec. 905. Disclosure to Director of Central Intelligence of foreign intelligence-
related information with respect to criminal investigations65 
 
These two provisions formally relax Congress’s powers of intelligence oversight.  
As discussed previously, there has also been a blurring between the domestic intelligence 
function, which in the past was the sole responsibility of the FBI, and the international 
intelligence responsibilities shared by the DoD, CIA, and State Department.  Some 
provisions of the PATRIOT Act are due to expire in December 2005. 
F.  POSSIBLE OVERSIGHT ABUSES IN 2005 
In the post-9/11 era, the primary concern has become: how to protect the United 
States from terrorist activities while maintaining the personal liberties we have come to 
expect.  Less than five years after the PATRIOT Act and other major efforts to reform the 
Intelligence Community, new abuses have begun to surface.  As reported in the San Jose 
Mercury News members of the California National Guard stand accused of conducting 
domestic surveillance activities at a peace rally held on Mother’s Day 2005.  The 
accusations are uncomfortably similar to those of the early 1970s.  The Mercury News, 
obtained evidence that the California National Guard monitored an Iraq War Protest on 
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Mother’s Day in Sacramento, California.  The event was cosponsored by Code Pink: 
Women for Peace; Raging Grannies, a group focused on nonviolent protest for peace and 
social change; and Gold Star Families for Peace, an organization made up of families of 
soldiers killed in Iraq.  The rally called on the government to bring the troops home.  
According to “davisenterprize.com” about thirty-five people attended the event.  What is 
of concern here is the allegation of domestic intelligence collection by the military.  The 
newspaper attained proof of the monitoring through e-mails concerning the event that 
were forward to high-ranking National Guard officials.  In one of them, Colonel Jeff 
Davis wrote, “Forwarding same to our Intell. folks who continue to monitor.”  After the 
press learned of the incident, the National Guard unit looked into the event and stated that 
the “monitoring” in this case was limited to watching televised newscasts of the event.  
What is possibly of more concern is that, after Colonel Davis’s retirement this summer, 
all documentation of the incident was erased from his computer hard drive.  “The Guard 
erased Davis’s computer hard drive on the very day California State Senator Joseph Dunn 
(D) indicated he was launching an investigation and called on the Guard not to destroy 
any evidence related to the intelligence unit.”66  The Guard claims that the destruction of 
hard-drive data is standard procedure when a member retires.   
The possible abuse of intelligence oversight by the California National Guard has 
reinitiated a debate about what role the military and other intelligence organizations 
should play in domestic intelligence collection activities, and also, what personal liberties 
Americans are willing to sacrifice in order to ensure protection from terrorists.  Another 
question may be, how much or how many personal liberties are Americans willing to 
sacrifice, especially, as the London underground bombings demonstrate, we cannot be 
protected from everything all the time.  On July 8, 2005, Brigadier General John 
Alexander, acting adjutant general, wrote in defense of the National Guard’s actions: 
“We were not in any way engaged in surveillance activities during the May 8, 2005 
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Mother’s Day Demonstration of any group.” He added, “We took reasonable steps to 
monitor media coverage of this upcoming event.”67  
While those activities have received some attention from the press, they have not 
garnered the public outrage evoked by the New York Time’s publication of the Pentagon 
Papers or the Time’s article revealing the CIA’s “Family Jewels.”  Critics of the 
California Guard’s actions point out that “for years, smoke has been pouring out of the 
National Guard headquarters, and Sen. Dunn just dialed in the fire alarm.  The military 
has no role in law enforcement. It is there to protect our borders.”68 
G.   MEASURING OVERSIGHT THE AGE OF REEVALUATION 
During the final period examined in this study, congressional oversight is rated as 
high.  This time period witnessed a huge upswing in congressional oversight.  Not only 
did Congress launch its own investigation into the September 11th attacks, but it also 
created the 9/11 Commission to provide a bipartisan assessment of the activities leading 
to the disaster and the response to the attacks.  The Intelligence Community was 
specifically targeted as an area needing reform.  This generated the most oversight and 
inquiry into the Intelligence Community since the revelation of the CIA’s “family jewels” 
and the creation of the Church and Pike Commissions, and, on the measurement scale 
found in Figure 6, it spiked another high in the degree of congressional oversight.  Like 
the early period of investigation, this high intensity of oversight will be limited in 
duration.  Congress will not maintain the same depth and coverage beyond a limited time 
frame required to enact critical reforms.  At some point, Congress’s attention will shift to 
more critical issues.  In this case, that diversion may have already presented itself in the 
need to examine why there was such an inadequate response to the disaster that struck the 
Gulf Coast in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  Congress is moving toward investigating; 
who or what agency, or agencies, or what officials or branches of government are 
responsible?  This disaster may shift the emphasis from the remaining 9/11 reforms. 
Peter Gill does note a word of caution for when the United States departs from a 
high level of congressional oversight;  He sees the potential for an Intelligence 
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Community with greater power to perform domestic observations coupled with a 
decrease in stringent oversight as a recipe for a reemergence of the abuses that started the 
first wave of reform.69 
 
Figure 6.  Assessment of Intelligence Oversight during the Age of Reevaluation 
 
H. THE FUTURE OF OVERSIGHT 
The creation of a director of national intelligence has the potential to greatly 
impact intelligence oversight.  The 9/11 commission recommended that  
“The National Intelligence Director would submit a unified budget 
for national intelligence that reflects priorities chosen by the National 
Security Council, an appropriate balance among the varieties of technical 
and human intelligence collection, and analysis. He or she would receive 
an appropriation for national intelligence and apportion the funds to the 
appropriate agencies, in line with that budget, and with authority to 
reprogram funds among the national intelligence agencies to meet any new 
priority (as counterterrorism was in the 1990s). The National Intelligence 
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Director should approve and submit nominations to the president of the 
individuals who would lead the CIA, DIA, FBI Intelligence Office, NSA, 
NGA, NRO, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, and other national 
intelligence capabilities.”70   
Congressional leaders have attempted to limit the power of the new national 
intelligence director.  Not only has Congress thwarted attempts to provide the DNI 
primary budget responsibility, it also attempted to limit his power to transfer intelligence 
personnel.  The personnel-transfer restriction, which failed to pass, would have subjected 
the DNI to congressional approval to perform simply acts of his own office.   
The DNI must be able to directly oversee intelligence collection inside the United 
States, yet law and custom counsels against giving such a plainly domestic role to the 
head of the CIA (9/11 Commission Report).  Simply by virtue of the responsibilities 
invested in the office, he or she will have a profound role in intelligence oversight.  While 
the DoD has managed to prevent the DNI from gaining the budgetary responsibility the 
9/11 commission envisioned, his power to nominate and transfer senior members of the 
Intelligence Community, should enable the DNI to compel their compliance with 
oversight requirements.  Also, since the first line of oversight protection lies within an 
organization, in the internal inspector general function, the DNI has the opportunity to 
direct the leadership and the policies that will enforce the rules throughout the 
Intelligence Community.   
The 9/11 attacks ushered in a new era of oversight.  Previously, oversight was 
focused primarily on preventing intelligence-system abuses and realigning functions in a 
post-Cold War world.  Given the events of 9/11 and the miscalculations associated with 
the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction estimates, we foresee an oversight policy designed 
to prevent mistakes.  While this is a lofty and noble goal, it may not be attainable.  The 
general hope is that, through oversight, reforms, and new policies, the United States can 
prevent tragedies such as 9/11, but if the London bombings can teach us anything, it is 
that no matter how well prepared we are, we will always be vulnerable. 
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I.   CONCLUSIONS 
The post 9/11 period has, at least temporarily, increased congressional oversight.  
Once again, Congress was asked to play a stronger role in the monitoring and direction of 
the Intelligence Community.  Only time will tell if the legislature accepts this expanded 
role.  While there have been turf battles within the executive branch over the changes 
proposed by the 9/11 Commission, the Intelligence Community itself is not fighting the 
changes.  Perhaps the community has come to accept the reforms, since they were also 
proposed several times before.  What has changed has been the role of the intelligence 
agencies whose focus is on foreign intelligence.  There has been a blurring of the line 
prohibiting involvement in domestic operations.  As satellites and aircraft are now used to 
collect intelligence over the United States and as intelligence is now shared between 
domestic and foreign intelligence operations, there has been a dramatic change in the 
Intelligence Community’s role and that increases the need for adequate congressional 
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VI. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT:  WHERE DO WE GO 
FROM HERE 
 
“We can ask 20 questions, and if we haven't asked exactly the right question, and 
we don't ask the 21st question, we don't get the information that I think this committee 




In examining the history of intelligence oversight reforms, it may be important to 
keep in mind words of Justice Louis Brandeis.  He reminded Americans that our 
founding fathers did not seek “to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power.  The purpose was not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable 
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among the three 
departments, to save the people from autocracy.”72  This is equally true in the world of 
intelligence operations. The division of that secret world, while inefficient, can also 
prevent the concentration of power and the types of abuses witnessed since the 
intelligence communities’ foundation from destroying our democracy.   
Congressional oversight has grown since the blissful ignorance of the 1950s and 
1960s and the outrage and indignation following the inquiries of the Iran-contra affair 
and domestic intelligence abuses.  But the history of oversight has revealed a 
fundamental weakness.  As expressed by former House Intelligence Committee 
Chairman Lee Hamilton, “There is no way that oversight works unless you tell them [the 
overseers] the truth.”73  This may demonstrate the greatest weakness in our oversight 
system: at some point Congress needs someone to tell it the truth.  We are on the cusp of 
a new epoch of oversight.  The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 
2004, which President Bush signed into law on December 19, 2004, enacted many of the 
reform proposals generated over the years.  How effective those reforms will be, only 
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time will tell.  What are some of the trends or common issues that run through our 
country’s almost sixty-year history of congressional intelligence oversight?  The past 
thirty years of inquiry, investigations, and reevaluation demonstrate several trends in 
intelligence oversight.  They include a congressional reluctance to institute substantial 
change, reoccurrence of the same reform requirements, and common problems in 
implementation. 
A.   COMMON REFORM THEMES 
There are several common themes or ideas that reoccur over the various ages of 
oversight.  The most prominent has been the call for a director of national intelligence 
with budget, personnel, and coordinating authority.  This recommendation is in the 
Church and Pike commission reports, in the Aspin-Brown and IC21 investigations, in the 
9/11 Commission Report, and in the HPSCI and SSCI investigations into 9/11.  Several 
times before, the Congress has attempted to create a DNI with central control over the 
vast intelligence empire, but until recently, all efforts have failed.  Since the idea of a 
DNI was first proposed, several executive orders and the McCurdy legislation after the 
Iran-contra affair all attempted to create the office, or to vest additional powers in the 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency that would allow that person to act in a more 
central role.  All attempts failed, primarily due to stonewalling by the Defense 
Department and its supporters, who feared that a loss of budget and personnel control 
would put tactical and operational military activities at risk.   It was not until the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that the position of DNI was 
established, and even that was a struggle.  The Pentagon, through the auspices of 
Congressman Duncan Hunter, a Republican from California, was able to delay a vote on 
a reform bill until an agreement was worked out between the congressional leadership 
and the White House.  Hunter felt that the reform bill “was elevating for the DNI but 
detrimental to the defense secretary . . . a change that would make war fighters not sure to 
whom they report and translate into confusion on the battlefield.”74  The agreement 
allowed DoD to maintain much of its control over the intelligence budget and “preserve 
the chain of command” for military intelligence.  Monetarily, this is significant, with the 
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amount of the intelligence budget controlled by the Pentagon estimated at 80 percent or 
roughly $30 billion, divided between the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 
Security Agency, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (formerly known as 
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency).75  DoD concerns were well voiced by Bruce 
Berkowitz, in the on-line Hover Digest,  
Proposals to yank intelligence organizations out of the Defense 
Department also overlook the role they play in combat operations today. 
The ability to feed electronic data to units on the battlefield through digital 
pipelines is essential for the kind of network-style warfare that has proved 
so effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. Combat forces use more of this data 
than anyone else. It seems odd that anyone would want to drag several 
intelligence organizations out of the Defense Department simply to create 
a new mega-organization whose main mission would be . . . supporting the 
Defense Department.76   
The Department of Defense argued that removing budget control from its purview 
would impact the intelligence chain of command and unity of effort and add an 
unnecessary level of interference between those that generate intelligence and those who 
use it.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers voiced his concerns 
in a letter to Congressman Hunter, saying that it was imperative that the DoD “maintains 
this vital flow of resources through the secretary of defense to the combat-support 
agencies.”77  While valid, this assessment overlooks the important role that the various 
agencies within the Intelligence Community play in keeping policymakers and national 
leadership informed of potential threats. It does underscore, however, the concerns within 
the DoD and congressional leadership related to changes in budgetary and personnel 
control.  
Another common theme throughout the various intelligence investigations was 
the call for a joint committee on intelligence oversight.  The Intelligence Community of 
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the 21st Century investigation was the only commission that did not feel this was the best 
way to organize congressional oversight and even that group recognized the need to 
examine committee manning and term limits.  While the 9/11 commission agreed that a 
joint committee would be one way to reorganize, it also recognized that it was not the 
only way.  What the commission did find was that the current structure is 
“dysfunctional.”  President Bush agreed.  When signing the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act, he stated, “The 9/11 Commission also made several 
recommendations about Congress itself. I strongly agree with the commission’s 
recommendation that oversight and intelligence--oversight of intelligence and of the 
homeland security must be restructured and made more effective. There are too many 
committees with overlapping jurisdiction, which wastes time and makes it difficult for 
meaningful oversight and reform.”78  Unfortunately, this is where the recent reform 
movement seemed to run out of steam.  It is unknown if we will witness substantive 
reform in the way Congress conducts oversight.   
Declassifying the intelligence budget is another reoccurring theme that runs 
throughout the various investigations.  Most of the investigative commissions felt that the 
overall budget numbers should be released, while members of the Intelligence 
Community raised concerns that the overall number tracked over time could be an 
indicator of intelligence priorities and investments in new systems.  Concerns aside, the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act directed: “The President shall disclose 
to the public for each fiscal year after fiscal year 2005 the aggregate amount of 
appropriations requested in the budget of the President for such fiscal year for the 
National Intelligence Program.”79  
B.   COMMON PROBLEMS 
Since the onset of intelligence oversight, there have not only been common 
themes, but also common restrictions.  As much as the Congress, and sometimes the 
executive branch, pushed for a single centralized director of intelligence with budgetary 
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control, there has been a corresponding community resistance predominately within the 
Department of Defense.    The goal of the director’s office is to provide a top layer of 
oversight, which appears to most outside the community as the logical location for that 
type of communitywide coordination.  The position as envisioned will, hopefully 
maximize budgets, and provide a consolidation of intelligence efforts.  The goal is that 
budget and analytical control will prevent duplication of effort.  Unfortunately, for the 
Department of Defense, the proposal not only shifts major funding from their control, but 
also raises fears that intelligence assets will be focused on national problem sets, which 
could leave operational and tactical intelligence users bereft of resources.  To date, DoD 
has had enough supporters within the Congress to stave off any efforts to move its 
intelligence allocation to the control of a central office.  Essentially, these forces 
successfully argued that placing control of these intelligence functions outside of the 
DoD would violate the central principle of unity of command. 
Congressional reluctance may be the most profound factor preventing the pursuit 
of meaningful oversight.  All significant and successful oversight efforts have been 
prompted by media disclosures coupled with public outcry.  Oversight is not a job that 
the Congress has vigorously pursued.  This reluctance has many causes.  The secrecy 
surrounding the Intelligence Community is a major factor:  it makes it difficult for 
congressional leaders to disclose their role to their constituents and is a double-edged 
sword.  Some in the Congress do not want to know secrets.  They do not want the burden 
of trying to remember where and when they heard data, what can be discussed, and what 
will get them into trouble as a leak.  Intelligence has not always been associated with 
political favors.  It is difficult to return to a senate or congressional district and get 
reelected when candidate cannot recount how their membership on an intelligence 
committee benefited their district.  Kathryn Olmstead noted that playing a lead role in the 
1970s investigations did not prove favorable politically for either Frank Church or Otis 
Pike.  Church, originally thought to be Carter’s likely running mate, felt his participation 
in the investigation had ruined his chances for the vice-presidency.  What was worse, 
despite the very public role he had played and his significant contribution to intelligence 
reform, he failed in his reelection bid in 1980.  Pike, thought to have aspirations for the 
Senate or a committee chairmanship returned to Congress for an additional term before 
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retiring from public office.80  Additional difficulty is the size and complexity of the 
Intelligence Community.  It is difficult for intelligence professionals to understand and 
manage, let alone congressional overseers with little or no intelligence background.  
Thus, there is a steep learning curve associated with oversight of the Intelligence 
Community.  Lastly, members do not want to be tainted when there is a failure or an 
abuse.  Congress has successfully remained outside of the blame for intelligence 
problems.  Their investigations and reforms aid in returning credibility to the community, 
but their separateness and possession of deniability when it comes to responsibility 
causes blame to be focused solely on the Intelligence Community itself, rather than partly 
on the overseers or the executive leadership.  
As of the writing of this study, there has been no meaningful progress in 
congressional oversight reform.  The scope of the problem is underscored by the response 
to the 9/11 Commission’s Report and the efforts to reform the Intelligence Community.  
After the release of the report, nine separate committees generated reform proposals.  
Former Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge reported having to testify before the 
congress “no less than 140 times” in a single year.81  This demonstrates the scope of the 
problem that the current oversight structure presents for effective, coordinated, and 
unified control.  While the current system has been found to be “dysfunctional” and 
congressional reform “may be among the most difficult and important,”82 it has also been 
the area that has made the least progress. 
C.   OBSERVATIONS 
Much like the 1940-1950s period when America seemed willing to give up some 
personal liberties in order to ensure peace and prosperity, the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
limited outcry from the most recent published abuses of domestic intelligence-gathering 
seem to indicate that Americans are mostly concerned with terrorism and security and 
therefore are willing to sacrifice personnel liberties.  This is a slippery slope, or more 
likely, a pendulum swing.  As the United States settles into the realities of a “War on 
Terrorism” that is unlikely to have a clear or quick end, along with the probability that 
                                                 
80 Olmstead, 192. 
81 Congress, Reform Thyself too, The Christian Science Monitor (http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0812/p08s02-
comv.html), accessed 2 September 2005. 
82 9/11 Commission Report, 436. 
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more cases of illegal domestic intelligence collection will arise, the reaction will change.  
Once our population feels that the security gained is not in proportion to the liberties lost, 
the public outcry and media discussion will force a new round of investigations, hearings, 
and committees.  This in turn will refocus attention on intelligence oversight once again, 
and once again, Congress is likely to recommend a joint committee, a more active role, 
and will reiterate the existing prohibitions and protections.   
Just as in previous eras of oversight, we can expect the congress to step back from 
its reform efforts with a sense that their measures have gone far enough and may actually 
inhibit the Intelligence Community.  The current reform effort is likely to lose steam 
prior to all of the recommendations being enacted.  Congressional oversight will return to 
its autopilot setting until the next intelligence abuse or failure that is great enough to 
warrant public outcry and demand for changes.   
The unfortunate history of intelligence oversight demonstrates that it is only a 
priority when the public makes it a priority.  Congress gets lost in other issues and day-
to-day operations and neglects oversight of the Intelligence Community until the media 
focuses public attention on oversight issues.  Our Intelligence Community would likely 
benefit from consistent and persistent oversight and a Congress that is involved to the 
point of understanding its role and responsibility for the conduct of the Intelligence 
Community.  The current ebb and flow of oversight makes it difficult for the Intelligence 
Community to anticipate congressional requirements.  
D.   EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
In light of 9/11, it is time to reevaluate the direction the Intelligence Community 
was given in Executive Order 12333 and to update as appropriate.  For example, the EO 
directs that “Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition 
among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.” But in the wave of change 
after 9/11, the community has been told to move away from competition and to focus on 
cooperation.  At a minimum, a new EO should address the changes in responsibilities, the 
role of the DNI, the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and changes 
in domestic intelligence collection as a result of the USA PATRIOT Act.  Previous EOs 
have specifically directed the DoD and CIA to focus solely on foreign collection, but in 
the aftermath of 9/11 both began to have a closer involvement in domestic intelligence.  
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Today, members of the CIA and DoD intelligence communities are staffing terrorism 
centers with the FBI.  The Department of Defense is involved in imagery collection over 
the United States.  As recently as 5 September 2005, CNN reported a planned use of 
military unmanned aerial vehicles to survey the damage wrought by Hurricane Katrina.  
Under existing laws these activities violate intelligence oversight prohibitions.   
E.   RECOMMENDATIONS 
Why are these issues so important?  A discussion with a former Office of Special 
Investigations Officer reveal issues our FBI, CIA and DOD intelligence professionals 
currently face.  They don’t know where to draw the line.  As she related, in the years 
since 9-11, she has observed or participated in multiple conversations with co-workers in 
which someone expressed the need to monitor anti-war demonstrations in their local 
community.  These officers had been trained in intelligence oversight, but through 
patriotism, good intentions, or confusion over the blurring of roles with the advent of 
homeland defense, they were willing to undertake actions that violate current oversight 
rules.  It would be in the best interest of both American citizens and all intelligence 
professionals if the president issued an executive order covering oversight in the age of 
homeland defense.  It would also be prudent for the individual agencies and their 
inspector generals to engage in regular oversight briefings and to conduct case studies 
based on the new situations facing intelligence professionals.  There is a great potential 
for well-intentioned individuals to violate current oversight protections if they do not 
receive regular and updated guidance. 
A new executive order is the lynch pin to preventing misunderstandings and 
potential abuses of power.  The current EO is over thirty years old and was drafted to 
address concerns of a different era.  What we need now is concrete guidance on what is 
appropriate, what can be expected from the newly formed segments of government, and 
how older elements are expected to respond to new and dynamic missions.  With such 
guidance, department inspector generals can design new training and address the new 
issues they confront.  If, as the 9/11 report speculates, the oversight rules were part of the 
problems that prevented intelligence sharing and adequate monitoring of potential threats, 
then that is all the more reason to reexamine existing guidance and update it to reflect 
current needs and goals.   
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F.   CONCLUSIONS 
“As we have seen, Congress, the press and the public were uneasy about going 
too far—about examining too closely all the dark secrets in the nation’s musty corners.  
Ultimately, many Americans were tired of the controversy and the constant batter of the 
nation’s institutions.”83  These words were written in reference to the investigations of 
the 1970s, but could equally apply now.  It appears that the American public has grown 
weary of the investigations into the problems reported by 9/11 committees.  It is likely 
they would have grown tired sooner had not Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, and the George W. Bush administration kept the issues alive.   
As long as the American public, media, and even the Congress expect the 
Intelligence Community to be almost clairvoyant in its assessments, the community will 
continue to experience waves of oversight and investigation.  It is interesting to note, 
especially in countries that have been subjected to repeated, regular terrorist activities, 
whether domestic or foreign, that there does not appear to be the same expectation of 
perfect performance by the Intelligence Community that we see in the United States.  
Unfortunately, publication of the intelligence budget could make the Intelligence 
Community’s situation more difficult if the American population begins to believe that 
the cost associated with maintaining the community does not equate to its performance.  
This situation would be compounded, because the community, for security reasons, is 
rarely able to broadcast its successes but has not always been equally capable of hiding 
its failures. 
According to Loch Johnson, for “most of their history, the nation’s intelligence 
agencies have enjoyed immunity from close oversight by outside supervisors.”84  Has 
congressional oversight then been completely unsuccessful?  No, while oversight has not 
necessarily lived up to its potential or been as widespread as legislators or supporters 
would have hoped, it has been generally beneficial to the Intelligence Community.  While 
the track record for congressional oversight has been somewhat spotty, going from 
virtually nonexistent to occasionally disinterested, it has helped the community overall.  
                                                 
83 Olmstead, 182-3. 
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Former DCI Robert M. Gates underscored the impact of congressional oversight when he 
wrote,  
…some awfully crazy schemes might well have been approved had 
everyone present [in the White House] not known and expected hard 
questions, debate and criticism from the Hill.  And when, on a few 
occasions, Congress was kept in the dark, and such schemes did proceed, 
it was nearly always to the lasting regret of the presidents involved.85  
 
So, while congressional oversight has not been perfect, Congress is dependent on the 
executive or the media to inform it of egregious violations.  Though oversight provides 
only limited political clout, it is still recognized as a vital government function.   
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